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내부회계관리제도(internal controls for financial reporting: ICFR)는 회계정보 신뢰성을 위한 내부통제이다. 최근 금감원은 상장기업의 ‘재무제표 작성책임’을 강화하는 조치들을 시행하였다. 이는 K-IFRS의 복잡성 때문에 내부회계관리제도가 K-IFRS의 시행 이후에 취약하게 될 가능성을 감독하기 위한 것이다. 그러나 강화되는 내부회계관리제도에 대한 감독에 불구하고 회계실무에서 인식하고 있는 내부회계관리제도 효과성에 대한 인식은 K-IFRS 도입 이후에도 낮은 수준이다. 본 연구는 K-IFRS 도입 전․후 내부회계관리제도 중요한 취약점 보고 기업에 대한 감사인들의 행동과 감사품질 차이를 조사함으로써, 실제 실증조사결과가 이러한 인식과 어떻게 차이가 있는지 조사한다. 실증조사 결과, 중요한 내부회계관리제도 취약점 보고 기업․연도(MatWeak)와 K-IFRS 도입 전ㆍ후 기간에 중요한 취약점을 보고한 기업(MWfirm_pre와 MWfirm_post)의 감사시간, 감사보수, 시간당감사보수와 재량발생액절댓값은 모두 유의한 양의 계수값을 가졌다. 반면에 중요한 취약점 변수(보고 기업․연도 기준[MatWeak] 또는 보고시기 기준 취약점보고기업[MWfirm_pre와 MWfirm_post])들의 K-IFRS 도입 이후 감사품질 관련성의 변동은 항목별로 다소 차이가 있었다. 특별히 주목을 끄는 사항은, K-IFRS 도입전 취약점보고기업(MWfirm_pre)의 감사시간, 감사보수, 재량발생액(절댓값)이 K-IFRS 도입후 취약점보고기업(MWfirm_post)보다 유의하게 크며, K-IFRS 도입 이후 이러한 차이 폭이 감소한 것이다. 이는 내부회계관리제도 효과성에 대한 부정적 인식에도 불구하고 K-IFRS 도입 이후 내부회계관리제도 취약기업들에서 개선효과를 실증확인하였다는 점에서 실무적 시사점이 있다. 또한 본 연구에서 내부회계관리제도 취약성이 감사시간 및 시간당보수와 유의한 양의 관계가 있음을 실증확인한 것도 추가적 공헌점이다.


The internal accounting control systems (IACS) (or internal controls for financial reporting [ICFR]) is a part of a corporate internal controls, specifically pursuing reliabilities of financial information. Korea has fully implemented the Korea-adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (K-IFRS) in 2010 to improve international recognitions on Korean accounting transparency (the Financial Supervisory Commission [FSC] and the Financial Supervisory Services [FSS] 2007). Recently, the FSS also takes actions to strengthen the public company’s responsibility to prepare its financial statements; such more stringent supervision on accounting controls or the IACS is in line with the thoughts that they are integral parts of the procedures for soft-landing of the implementation of K-IFRS (FSS 2007). However, in spite of stronger supervision on the IACS, a recent survey indicates that overall effectiveness of the IACS in Korea is not well-appreciated among the financial reporting stakeholders (financial executives and employees of public companies, accounting information users, certified public accountants [auditors], and accounting professors)(Lee 2014). This paper investigates the relations of internal control weakness firms with audit hours, audit fees, and audit quality and their changes after adoption of K-IFRS. For this purpose, we attend to the situation that the regulator recognizes importance of the IACS upon full implementation of K-IFRS, and takes regulatory actions to strengthen corporate responsibility for preparations of financial statements, however, overall recognition on internal control effectiveness among accounting stakeholders is low. Accordingly, we find whether such stakeholders’ low recognition on the IACS effectiveness is consistent with any empirical evidences; i.e. we investigate whether the material control weakness firms are related with auditor’s behaviors (audit hours and audit fees) and audit quality (or financial reporting quality). More specifically, we examine (i) whether control weakness firms have higher audit hours and audit fees, and absolute discretionary accruals, and (ii) whether there are any changes in such higher difference in audit hours and audit fees, and absolute discretionary accruals after adoption of K-IFRS. Final samples of 8,721 firm-years are selected, after deleting omitted variable samples, from 9,511 firm-years of the non-financial public companies with the December- ending fiscal years from 2008 to 2013, which are listed in the KOSPI and KOSDAQ stock markets. Experimental samples are (i) 260 firm-years reporting material control weakness (MatWeak), and (ii) the firms (644 firm-years) reporting once or more material control weakness during the sample periods (MWfirm) (MWfirm samples comprise of 445 firm-years of MWfirm_pre samples and 251 firm-years of MWfirm_post samples). In the results, we found that material control weakness samples (both MatWeak and MWfirm [MWfirm_pre와 MWfirm_post]) are positively associated with audit hours, audit fees, hourly audit fees, and absolute discretionary accruals. Meanwhile, changes of such associations with audit hours, audit fees and absolute discretionary accruals vary across the experimental variables. More specifically, we found insignificant changes in associations between MatWeak and audit hours, audit fees, hourly audit fees, and absolute discretionary accruals. Similarly, we found insignificant changes in associations between MWfirm_pre/MWfirm_post, and audit hours/audit fees, except for audit fees where their associations increase significantly. However, MWfirm_pre’s changes in associations with absolute discretionary accruals are significantly negative only for AbsRoaDisAccr; as contrary to this, MWfirm_post’s changes in associations with absolute discretionary accruals are significantly positive for all three proxies. Drawing more attentions, we find that audit hours, audit fees and absolute discretionary accruals of MWfirm_pre samples are higher than those of the MWfirm_post samples, and such differences’ magnitude decreased after adoption of K-IFRS. These findings indicate that material control weakness firm’s association with auditor behavior (audit hours and audit fees) and audit quality (absolute value of discretionary accruals) vary across the experimental variables. More specifically, a comparison of MWfirm_pre and MWfirm_post samples indicates that we find significant differences in audit hours, audit fees and discretionary accruals between two sample groups as well as significant differences in the pre- and post-IFRS adoption period changes. This is contrary to the perceptions of financial reporting stakeholders that internal controls effectiveness remain low even after K-IFRS adoption, and, accordingly, has practical implications. In addition, prior studies (Lee et al. 2008; Choi and Choi 2010) reports control weaknesses are significantly associated with audit fees, but they have not find significant relations between control weaknesses and audit hours. However, we find that control weaknesses are associated with audit hours and hourly audit fees as well as total audit fees. This is consistent with both audit risk model and intuitive judgement; the more risks, the more audit inputs and audit charges.