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본 연구에서는 정치적 의무를 규범적으로 정당화하려는 주요한 이론들을 유형별로 분류·검토하였다. 주요 이론들을 유형화하는 틀은 자발적 및 비자발적 요구 그리고 일반적 및 특수적 요구를 조합하여 특수적-비자발적, 특수적-자발적, 일반적-비자발적, 일반적-자발적 범주를 활용하였다. 그 결과 정치적 의무에 대한 결사 이론을 특수적-비자발적 범주로, 상호계약적 설명을 특수적-자발적 범주로, 자연적 의무 이론을 일반적-비자발적 범주로, 그리고 자기-절제 이론을 일반적-자발적 범주로 분류하였고, 각각의 유형이 가지는 장점과 약점을 논의하였다. 대체적으로 볼 때, 정치적 의무를 비자발적 범주에서 파악하려는 이론들은 자발성의 부족으로 인한 동기화의 문제를 가지고 있으며, 자발적 범주의 이론들은 자발성을 확보하는 방안과 관련하여 문제가 있었다. 또한 정치적 의무를 일반적 범주에서 파악하려는 이론들은 개별성의 문제가 있었으며, 특수적 범주에서 파악하려는 이론들은 의무의 내용에 대한 특정화의 어려움 그리고 혜택과 의무의 비대칭성에서 발생하는 문제들을 가지고 있는 것처럼 보인다. 향후 정치적 의무에 대한 정당화 이론이 4개 범주의 강점을 비교적 포괄하면서도 약점을 보완하는 내적 정합성을 가진 거대 이론으로 발전하기를 기대한다.


I have classified the theories of political obligations into four categories and researched, respectively, their strong and weak points. My framework for classification is special-nonvoluntary requirements, special-voluntary requirements, general-nonvoluntary requirements, and general-voluntary requirements. 'Voluntary' requirements are those moral requirements we have because of some voluntary performance on our part. 'Nonvoluntary' requirements are those that fall us nonvoluntarily, by virtue of our occupying some nonvoluntary role or status. 'Special' requirements are those that arise out of special relationships we have with specific persons or groups. 'General' requirements are those that bind persons regardless of their special relationships, acts, or roles. Associative theories of political obligation understood our political obligations as a kind of associative moral requirements that attaches to an unchosen role of citizen. I have classified political obligations that arise from associative accounts as special-nonvoluntary requirements. These kinds of requirements can specify the objects of obligations, however, are unable to specify the contents of obligations and to motivate persons to practice them. Transactional accounts explain political obligations as those that arise from our some specific transactions or interactions with the state (or with our fellow citizens). I have included transactional accounts as special-voluntary requirements. These can specify not only the objects and the contents of obligations but also solve the problem of motivation. But, they have the flaws not to invent methods to get consents from people and to solve the problem of asymmetry between benefits and costs. Natural duty theories insist that our political obligations are implied by those moral duties that bind all persons naturally to promote some impartial moral good(e.g., justice, happiness or common good). I have assorted them to general-nonvoluntary requirements. These requirements are unable to specify to which institutions we are bound and to motivate persons to practice them. Self-restraint theory argues that our political obligations are occurred in our mind when we voluntarily decide to bind ourself to the state authority in order to overcome our weak motivation to cooperate with others and feebleness of our will to external temptations. I have classified political obligations that arise from self-restraint theory as general-voluntary requirements. These have the flaw to exclude those who will not bind voluntarily themselves to state autonomy from political obligation and the problem of particularity. Considering all of the above things, we need to develop theories of political obligations which are comprehensive and complex to cover four categories.