초록 close

서비스 고객을 부분 종업원으로 볼 수 있다는 시각이 공감대를 넓혀가면서 시장의 면면을 잘 알아서 주변 소비자에 일정한 영향력을 미치는 소위 시장통달자(market maven)가 주변의 일반고객 집단에 도움(helping)을 제공하도록 촉진하는 사례가 빈번히 목격되고 있다. 그런데 고객도움행동과 관련된 최근의 연구를 보면 보상을 통한 고객도움행동 촉진 가능성을 확인하거나, 일반고객 대상의 고객도움행동 촉진 인센티브를 조명하는데 그치고 있어 주요한 도움행동의 원천으로 주목받고 있는 시장통달자의 특성에 따른 맞춤식 인센티브에 대해서는 관심을 기울이지 못하고 있다. 본 연구에서는 마케터가 일반 고객 집단에 도움행동을 제공하도록 촉진하기 위해 높거나 낮은 집단성향을 지닌 시장통달자에게 비용보조와 성과보상 인센티브를 제시하고, 해당 시장통달자가 도움행동을 하는 순차적 게임 모형을 통해 시사점을 모색해보았다. 본 연구의 주요결과는 다음과 같다: (1) 시장통달자의 집단성향이 높을수록 서비스업체가 시장통달자에 제시하는 도움행동 촉진 성과보상은 줄이고 비용보조를 늘리는 것이 유리하다. (2) 서비스업체가 시장통달자에 제시하는 도움행동 촉진 인센티브 총합은 시장통달자의 집단성향이 전반적으로 낮을 때에는 시장통달자의 집단성향 증가에 맞추어 적극적으로 제시하는 것이 유리하지만, 시장통달자의 집단성향이 충분히 높을 때에는 시장통달자의 집단성향 증가에 맞추어 줄여가는 것이 바람직하다. (3) 서비스업체는 시장통달자의 집단성향이 높을수록 더 높은 이윤을 얻는다.


Research in marketing finds many episodes of market mavens' helping other customers. However, most research has studied market mavens' influential function in the introductory stage of new product diffusion process. Consequently, very little is known about the market mavens' helping behavior mechanism in non introductory market situations. In this paper, we try to understand market maven's helping behavior mechanism and find better way to stimulate market maven's helping behavior. We investigate optimal incentive scheme for market maven of diverse collectivist consumer tendencies via game-theoretic modeling. Especially, we focus on the following two type of incentives often observed in the real world: performance-based bonus and cost-subsidy. We focus on the following issues: How do market mavens of high (low) level of collectivist consumer tendencies behave as possible market helpers?, What incentive level and structure is recommendable for marketers to stimulate market mavens of high (low) level of collectivist consumer tendencies to help other customers?We focus on the impact of market mavens' collectivist tendencies on the optimal incentive structure for marketers to stimulate market mavens to help other customers. So we consider two players in the game, a marketer and a market maven. Our model is of complete information game type. In our model, the marketer is the Stackelberg leader and the market maven is the follower. Our model is of two stages in a single period. Variables in the model are as following table. [table] Stages of the game are as follows. Stage 1:Marketer sets cost-subsidy level(ζ), performance-based bonus level(η), and price of the service(p). Stage2:Market maven sets helping effort level(a). Market maven gets cost-subsidy(aζ) immediately but gets performance-based bonus(aη) after performance verification. Since our model is a dynamic game, we try to find a subgame perfect equilibrium to derive useful implications. In order to obtain the subgame perfect equilibrium, we solve the problems using backward induction. In the backward induction process, we solve the problems backward from stage 2 to stage 1. By completely knowing follower's optimal reaction to the leader's potential actions, we can fold back the game tree backward. Equilibrium of each decision variable of the game is as following table. [table] Our findings are as follows: (1) The higher gets the collectivist consumer tendency level of market mavens', the higher portion of cost-subsidy is required relative to that of rewards in the equilibrium., (2) As the collectivist consumer tendency level of market mavens' increase, service firm had better increase total incentive in early stage but decrease in late stage. So, the optimal level of total incentive for the market maven makes inverted U shape along the collectivist consumer tendency level., (3) The service firm may acquire greater surplus through stimulating market mavens' helping behaviors when they have higher collectivist consumer tendencies. One of the major contributions of this study is that the current study firstly suggests some specific managerial implications for marketers in a service setting how to stimulate market mavens to help other consumers by using performance-based bonus and cost-subsidy especially under consideration of the impact of collectivist consumer tendencies of them.