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이 글은 보편사적 관심에 의해 행해진 불트만에 대한 판넨베르크의 비판을 재검토해서 실존에 대한‘심리적,’‘주관적’이해를 극복하고 실 존을 구조적인 관점에서 해석하여 그것을 해석학적으로 존재론적인 선 험적 조건으로 이해하고자 한다. 하이데거와 불트만의 연관성을 고려하여 먼저 이 글은 하이데거와 불트만의‘이해’개념에 대해서 논할 것이고, 바로 연이어 실존론적 이 해 개념에 대한 판넨베르크의 보편사적 비판을 상술할 것이다. 실존의 개념을 구조적으로 이해하기에 앞서 판넨베르크에 대한 나의 비판을 좀 더 분명히 하기 위해 후설의 선험적 주관주의와 하이데거의 해석학 적 존재론의 차이점을 부각시킬 것이고, 결론적으로 실존이 심리적인 것이 아니라 해석학적이고 존재론적인 개념임을 주장할 것이다.


According to Bultmann, every understanding starts with the peculiar question which means the pre-understanding. In his view, there can be the interest in the history as the sphere of life in which human beings acquires and develops their own possibilities. Insofar as human beings are historical beings, they seize their possibilities not a priori but in the true determination. Therefore, since I existentially have the pre-understanding for my Being-potentiality, the text discloses the potentiality of understanding about my existence. It discloses its meaning because I as the Being-possibility am already open to the text. Understanding is not to accept what is already given regardless of me passively. Since I am already the Being to my Being-potentiality in my self-understanding, I must always determine for my authentic Being. Therefore, understanding is conducted by the existential determination for the authentic Being. Not that first understanding, and then determination, but that first determination, and then understnding. According to Pannenberg, in the existential understanding, all the questions of meaning are limited to the human existential possibility which is expressed in the text. As a result, the sphere of meaning is reduced from the beginning, as the text is meaningful only by the possibility of self-understanding. But the text, he thinks, owns what cannot be resolved to the self-understanding. Pannenberg pays attention to the historical distance between the text to be interpreted and its interpreter. In his view, because of this historical distance, interpretation is demanded. The past text is connected to the present interpreter as the historical pastness which does not have to take off its pastness. The existential hermeneutics eliminates the historical distance between the present and the past that happens owing to the situation in which the interpreter cannot help interpreting the past transmitted text from the present of the interpreter by means of resolving the pastness of the text to the presentness of the interpreter. The text which is transmitted from the past keeps the pastness of the past because of the fact that it has been transmitted from the past. Pannenberg’s criticism on Bultmann’s hermeneutics seems not to see that the existence is not only the hermeneutical condition of the understanding of the world but also the ontologically transcendental condition of the possibility of the understanding of the world. The existence is not the discovery of various facts about the self and the world. It is the hermeneutical and ontological condition of the understanding of the world. It is not the self-projection in Feuerbach’s meaning that we can reconfirm through the theoretical reflection on the knowledge of the object. It is the possible condition of the knowledge of... including both the knowledge of the object and the knowledge of the self. Accordingly, there is no understanding without the existence. As Pannenberg suggests, we do not understand our existence after we reflect on the knowledge of the object which is prior to the existence logically. There was already the possibility of the existence in the concrete situation practically for the knowledge of the object to be possible. Therefore, the knowledge which has nothing to do with the existence is impossible practically, and even if it exists, it is like ‘noise’ for us.


According to Bultmann, every understanding starts with the peculiar question which means the pre-understanding. In his view, there can be the interest in the history as the sphere of life in which human beings acquires and develops their own possibilities. Insofar as human beings are historical beings, they seize their possibilities not a priori but in the true determination. Therefore, since I existentially have the pre-understanding for my Being-potentiality, the text discloses the potentiality of understanding about my existence. It discloses its meaning because I as the Being-possibility am already open to the text. Understanding is not to accept what is already given regardless of me passively. Since I am already the Being to my Being-potentiality in my self-understanding, I must always determine for my authentic Being. Therefore, understanding is conducted by the existential determination for the authentic Being. Not that first understanding, and then determination, but that first determination, and then understnding. According to Pannenberg, in the existential understanding, all the questions of meaning are limited to the human existential possibility which is expressed in the text. As a result, the sphere of meaning is reduced from the beginning, as the text is meaningful only by the possibility of self-understanding. But the text, he thinks, owns what cannot be resolved to the self-understanding. Pannenberg pays attention to the historical distance between the text to be interpreted and its interpreter. In his view, because of this historical distance, interpretation is demanded. The past text is connected to the present interpreter as the historical pastness which does not have to take off its pastness. The existential hermeneutics eliminates the historical distance between the present and the past that happens owing to the situation in which the interpreter cannot help interpreting the past transmitted text from the present of the interpreter by means of resolving the pastness of the text to the presentness of the interpreter. The text which is transmitted from the past keeps the pastness of the past because of the fact that it has been transmitted from the past. Pannenberg’s criticism on Bultmann’s hermeneutics seems not to see that the existence is not only the hermeneutical condition of the understanding of the world but also the ontologically transcendental condition of the possibility of the understanding of the world. The existence is not the discovery of various facts about the self and the world. It is the hermeneutical and ontological condition of the understanding of the world. It is not the self-projection in Feuerbach’s meaning that we can reconfirm through the theoretical reflection on the knowledge of the object. It is the possible condition of the knowledge of... including both the knowledge of the object and the knowledge of the self. Accordingly, there is no understanding without the existence. As Pannenberg suggests, we do not understand our existence after we reflect on the knowledge of the object which is prior to the existence logically. There was already the possibility of the existence in the concrete situation practically for the knowledge of the object to be possible. Therefore, the knowledge which has nothing to do with the existence is impossible practically, and even if it exists, it is like ‘noise’ for us.