초록 close

이 연구는레비나스의타자윤리를철학과신학을매개하는종교철학 적 담론으로전제했을때 문제제기가예상되는논의들을최근영어권철학 자 혹은신학자의입장을중심으로연구한글이다. 레비나스가본격적으 로 미국에알려지기시작한것은1 9 7 8년 데리다의논문“폭력과형이상학” (Violence and Metaphysics)이 번역소개된이후이다. 당시프랑스에서보 다 미국학계에서더 알려지고유명해진데리다가레비나스의철학을비중 있게다룬것이레비나스에대한관심을촉발시키는계기가된 것이다. 국 내에서레비나스에대한관심은주로철학적인관심이었다고할 수 있다. 다시말해레비나스의철학이마르틴하이데거(Martin Heidegger)와에드 문트후설(Edmund Husserl) 등으로이어지는독일관념론과어떠한차이를 갖고있는지국내몇몇연구자들에의해논의되었지만 레비나스의종교관 혹은신론에대해서는그리많은연구가이루어지지않은실정이다. 이러 한 현상은레비나스자신에의해야기된면이없지않다. 레비나스스스로 가 자신의철학은신학이아님을주장하고있기때문이다. 하지만레비나 스 사후그의글이철학을넘어여러신학자들과여타다른학문분야의학 자들에게인용되는이유는레비나스사상이가지는풍부한신학적함의때 문이라고할 것이다. 마치폴 리쾨르(Paul Ricoeur)가그의『해석이론』 (Interpretation Theory)에서말하듯이텍스트는저자의손을 떠나는순간 더 이상저자의것이아니듯말이다. 본 논문은레비나스의풍부한신학 적 함의들이최근영미권연구자에게어떻게받아들이는지를비판적으로 검토하고이를통해레비나스의사상의종교철학적성격을밝히는데있다.


Can Emmanuel Levinas’s ethic of the other be regarded as theology or philosophy of religion? This is a question undercurrent this article. In order to find some possible answers, I explore a recent Levinasian scholarship focused on anglophone countries. Some say, like Dominique Janicaud, that Levinas’s ethic of the other is more close to theology rather than phenomenology because Levinas does not apply a rigorous phenomenological method in his ethic of the other. Janicaud calls it “theological turn.” The other scholar, Jeffrey Kosky, says that Levinas’ ethic of the other is a kind of new attempt to open a field of philosophy of religion in terms of analyzing the source of responsibility phenomenologically and theologically as well. In light of these interpretations, I argue that Levinas’s ethic of the other can be understood as philosophy of religion by reminding it that its account of divine transcendence not only overcomes a limit of Husserl’s phenomenology but also shows a responsibility as an ultimate ethical obligation to the other.


Can Emmanuel Levinas’s ethic of the other be regarded as theology or philosophy of religion? This is a question undercurrent this article. In order to find some possible answers, I explore a recent Levinasian scholarship focused on anglophone countries. Some say, like Dominique Janicaud, that Levinas’s ethic of the other is more close to theology rather than phenomenology because Levinas does not apply a rigorous phenomenological method in his ethic of the other. Janicaud calls it “theological turn.” The other scholar, Jeffrey Kosky, says that Levinas’ ethic of the other is a kind of new attempt to open a field of philosophy of religion in terms of analyzing the source of responsibility phenomenologically and theologically as well. In light of these interpretations, I argue that Levinas’s ethic of the other can be understood as philosophy of religion by reminding it that its account of divine transcendence not only overcomes a limit of Husserl’s phenomenology but also shows a responsibility as an ultimate ethical obligation to the other.