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대북정책이 한국의 외교관계에서 매우 중요한 부분임에도 불구하고 남북관계를 선호도의 측면에 서 통사적으로 접근하려는 노력은 그 중요성에 비 해 부족한 것이 사실이다. 본 연구는 남북관계를 선호도 변화를 중심으로 통사적으로 고찰함으로 써, 역대 한국의 대북정책의 공과를 살펴보았다. 냉전시대 남북관계는“겁쟁이 게임”구조로 설명 된다. 이는 한반도에서 제2의 전쟁이 발생하지 않 았던 이유를 설명하고 있다. 또한 전망이론의 영역 효과는“겁쟁이 게임”구조에서 전면전이 아닌 국 지전 형태의 남북군사갈등이 발생한 원인을 설명 하고 있다. 국민의 정부 이후 남북관계는“수인의 딜레마 게임”으로 설명될 수 있다. 수인의 딜레마 구조에서 북한은 손실영역에 있어 협력을 추구할 동기가 마련되었고, 이후 한국의 적극적인 노력으 로 북한의 두려움과 유혹을 제어함으로써 남북협 력이 가능하였다. 참여정부 시절 남북관계에서 한국은 남북관계를 통한 북핵문제 해결 원칙과 평화경제론으로 미루 어 볼 때“겁쟁이 게임”구조의 선호도를 가지고 있 었던 반면, 북한은“수인의 딜레마 게임”구조를 가 지고 있었다. 이러한 남북선호도의 차이로 인해 한 국의 대북정책이 북한에 끌려가는 정책이라는 비 난을 받았던 것을 알 수 있다. 한편 이명박 정부의 남북관계는 북한의 반응에 따라 2가지 게임구조가 가능할 것으로 보인다. 이명박 정부는 수인의 딜레 마 구조를 가지고 있는 반면 북한은 상호협력(CC) 과 상호비협력(DD)의 선호도에 따라 수인의 딜레 마 게임이나, 교착게임으로 나타날 수 있다. 선호도를 중심으로 볼 때, 이명박 정부의 남북관 계는 먼저 남북이 상대의 선호도를 바꾸려는 치열 한 경쟁과 갈등이 예상된다. 한국 정부로서는 먼저 북한의 선호도에 따라 바꾸기 위해 북한이 수용 가능한 보다 정교한 비핵화 과정과 개혁과 개방 개념을 정립하고 설득하는 과정이 필요할 것으로 볼 수 있다.


There is few academic effort to review the history of inter-Korean relations in terms of preference order, even if inter-Korean relation is inter-state relations in which strategic interactions matter. This effort is expected to provide unbiased evaluation on success and failure of South Korean governments’ foreign policy toward North Korea. During the Cold War, inter-Korean relations can be explained by“ Chicken Game”, which account for why there is no the 2nd Korean War. Application of“ fame effect”of prospect theory also explains the reason that two Koreas were sometimes involved in a limited war or guerrilla wars. Kim Dae-Jung government’s new policy, called “sunshine policy”changed inter-Korean relations into “Prisoner’s Dilemma Game”in which mutual cooperation is possible with good policies. North Korea with PD game preference order in loss frame is motivated to get the benefits of mutual cooperation. Kim Ae-Jung government also reduced the fear and temptation of North Korea to take unilateral defection with good policies. It explain why inter-Korean cooperations in diverse issues are possible during Kim Dae-Jung government. Noh Moo-Hyun government had the preference order of “Chicken Game”, emphasizing “delinkage policy between North Korean nuclear issue and inter-Korean cooperation”and “peace economics”. But North Korea had PD game preference order. It can explain why Noh Moo-Hyun government’s North Korean policies were criticized as conceding policy in Korea. Lee Myung-Bak government’s North Korean policy are “Vision 3,000”of which precondition is denuclearization and openness of North Korea. While Lee Myung-Bak government has PD game preference order, North Korea has two different preference orders, PD game and Deadlock game, according to priority between mutual cooperation(CC) and mutual defection(DD). Preference orders of two Korea under Lee Myung-Bak government implies that inter-Korea relation is easy to the victim of conflict, and two Koreas do their all efforts to change other’s preference order. In order to be prosperous relations, Lee government needs to clarify debating concepts of openness and develop detail action plans for denuclearization which is acceptable to North Korea.


There is few academic effort to review the history of inter-Korean relations in terms of preference order, even if inter-Korean relation is inter-state relations in which strategic interactions matter. This effort is expected to provide unbiased evaluation on success and failure of South Korean governments’ foreign policy toward North Korea. During the Cold War, inter-Korean relations can be explained by“ Chicken Game”, which account for why there is no the 2nd Korean War. Application of“ fame effect”of prospect theory also explains the reason that two Koreas were sometimes involved in a limited war or guerrilla wars. Kim Dae-Jung government’s new policy, called “sunshine policy”changed inter-Korean relations into “Prisoner’s Dilemma Game”in which mutual cooperation is possible with good policies. North Korea with PD game preference order in loss frame is motivated to get the benefits of mutual cooperation. Kim Ae-Jung government also reduced the fear and temptation of North Korea to take unilateral defection with good policies. It explain why inter-Korean cooperations in diverse issues are possible during Kim Dae-Jung government. Noh Moo-Hyun government had the preference order of “Chicken Game”, emphasizing “delinkage policy between North Korean nuclear issue and inter-Korean cooperation”and “peace economics”. But North Korea had PD game preference order. It can explain why Noh Moo-Hyun government’s North Korean policies were criticized as conceding policy in Korea. Lee Myung-Bak government’s North Korean policy are “Vision 3,000”of which precondition is denuclearization and openness of North Korea. While Lee Myung-Bak government has PD game preference order, North Korea has two different preference orders, PD game and Deadlock game, according to priority between mutual cooperation(CC) and mutual defection(DD). Preference orders of two Korea under Lee Myung-Bak government implies that inter-Korea relation is easy to the victim of conflict, and two Koreas do their all efforts to change other’s preference order. In order to be prosperous relations, Lee government needs to clarify debating concepts of openness and develop detail action plans for denuclearization which is acceptable to North Korea.