초록 close

이 논문의 목적은 선군정치 시대의 당-군 관계를 핵심 엘리트의 위상 변화에 비중을 두고 재조명하는 데 있다. 선군시대에서 군의 위상이 강화된 것과 같이 군의 핵심 엘리트의 위상 또한 강화된 것을 알 수 있다. 하지만 이런 핵심 엘리트의 위상 강화가 기존 연구들이 주장하는 당-군 관계의 변화를 불러올 만큼의 영향력이 큰 것인지에 대해서 문제의식을 가지고 재분석을 시도했다. 분석 대상은 군내 당 조직에 의한 군 통제와 핵심 엘리트의 존재 및 역할, 당내 군 조직에 의한 통제와 핵심 엘리트의 존재 및 역할, 그리고 현지지도와 측근연회에 나타난 당과 군의 핵심 엘리트 비율 등이다. 이에 대한 분석에서는 기존의 분석 기준과는 다르게 당과 군의 핵심 엘리트를 보다 엄격히 분류하여 그 변화를 살펴보았다. 그 결과는 기존과 다른 점을 보였는데, 당-군 관계에서 당이 여전히 우위에 있음을 보여주었다. 결국 북한이 급박한 국내외적인 상황 변화에 대응하기 위해 선군을 내세움으로써 군 핵심 엘리트의 위상이 강화되기는 했지만 그것이 당-군 관계의 변화를 가져오지는 못했음을 의미한다.


The Study of Party-military Relations in the Military-first era of North Korea Suh, Seok-Min The purpose of this study is to reexamine party-military relations in the ‘military-first era’ of North Korea with a focus on the power change of core elites. Under the contemporary policy, the power of military has been remarkably intensified. In addition, we can easily verify that the position of military elite group has been considerably promoted to a higher rank. Nevertheless, this study finds it necessary to analyze whether the reinforcement in the military group really affects a reversion in the party-military relations as had been noted by preceding studies. Therefore the analysis was focused on the following: 1) the degree of control by party organs within the military circles; 2) the status and role of KWP elites among military authorities; and equally important, 3) the degree of control by military organs within the party; and 4) the status and role of military personnels in the party. Also an important factor was the changing ratio between the two groups at on-the-spot guidance and banquets of brain trusters. Analysis on the aforementioned criteria was based on a method different from previous studies. It was conducted with a more detailed and strict classification of the categories of the party and military groups. As a result, this study found that the party still remains in a superior position compared to the military group in spite of the military-first policy which has been deemed as a unique ideology belonging to the Kim Jong il era. In order to cope with urgent adversities at home and abroad, North Korea put forward its military allowing the rise of military elites to be distinctively observed. However, in conclusion, this should not be interpreted as a power shift from the party to the military group.


The Study of Party-military Relations in the Military-first era of North Korea Suh, Seok-Min The purpose of this study is to reexamine party-military relations in the ‘military-first era’ of North Korea with a focus on the power change of core elites. Under the contemporary policy, the power of military has been remarkably intensified. In addition, we can easily verify that the position of military elite group has been considerably promoted to a higher rank. Nevertheless, this study finds it necessary to analyze whether the reinforcement in the military group really affects a reversion in the party-military relations as had been noted by preceding studies. Therefore the analysis was focused on the following: 1) the degree of control by party organs within the military circles; 2) the status and role of KWP elites among military authorities; and equally important, 3) the degree of control by military organs within the party; and 4) the status and role of military personnels in the party. Also an important factor was the changing ratio between the two groups at on-the-spot guidance and banquets of brain trusters. Analysis on the aforementioned criteria was based on a method different from previous studies. It was conducted with a more detailed and strict classification of the categories of the party and military groups. As a result, this study found that the party still remains in a superior position compared to the military group in spite of the military-first policy which has been deemed as a unique ideology belonging to the Kim Jong il era. In order to cope with urgent adversities at home and abroad, North Korea put forward its military allowing the rise of military elites to be distinctively observed. However, in conclusion, this should not be interpreted as a power shift from the party to the military group.