초록 close

이글은 북한의 핵보유에 대한 규범적 평가를 위한 것이다. 그를 위해 우선 현행 국제법적 질서를 출발점으로 하되 그에 그치지 않고, 북미의 협상과정 그리고 핵억지에 대한 국제정치이론과 법철학적 논의까지 넓혀, 가능한 한 총체적 틀을 마련해 보고자 하였다. 글의 순서는 첫째, 핵무기 자체의 문제, 둘째, 북한의 핵보유 과정의 문제, 셋째, 핵억지(nuclear deterrence)론으로 되는데, 첫째 논점에서는 ICJ 권고적 의견과 북한의 입장, 둘째 논점에서는 북한의 NPT 탈퇴와 유엔 헌장의 ‘평화의 위협’의 문제, 셋째 논점에서는 핵억지론에 대한 규범적 담론들을 다루었다. 그 최종 결론은 북한의 핵보유는 지지할 수는 없다는 것이다. 그렇지만, 그것이 일반적인 인식처럼 북한에 국제규범 위반의 책임이 있다는 얘기는 아니다. 오히려 북한을 비난할 수 있는 국제법적 근거는 아주 미약하며, 만일 북한에 국제규범 위반의 책임을 물으려면 미국도 그로부터 자유로울 수 없다는 것이다. 그러나 북한의 핵보유는 궁극적으로 정당화되기는 어렵다. 북한이 핵무기를 단지 최후의 억지력으로만이 아니라 정치경제적 도구로 활용하는 경우에는 더욱 그렇다. 북한의 핵억지론은 현실주의적 최대주의의 논리로는 설명될 수 있으나, 정전론에서의 최소주의의 논리에는 부합하기 어려운 것이다.


The Normative Assessment of the North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Chung, Tai-Uk Professor, Ajou University This essay is an attempt at a comprehensive normative assessment on the North Korea’s nuclear weapons. It does not see North Korea’s nuclear weapons illegal in the current international law. Nevertheless, it does not approve of them in the wider sense of law. This essay begins with the question of legality of the nuclear weapons themselves. Here the advisory opinion of ICJ of 1996 provides a good reference. Secondly, this essay addresses the question whether or not North Korea is entitled to nuclear weapons even if the weapons are not illegal per se. Here the validity of the North Korea’s withdrawal from NPT matters. Even though North Korea’s withdrawal from NPT is valid, North Korea’s nuclear weapons would be blamed as threat to peace on the Chapter 7 of UN Charter. Last but not least, the nuclear deterrence is to be considered. There are various theses that legitimizes the deterrence policy in the realm of both international relations theory and the just war theory. North Korea’s deterrence policy could win approval of the realists like Kenneth Waltz, but would fail to satisfy the requirements of the just war theory.


The Normative Assessment of the North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Chung, Tai-Uk Professor, Ajou University This essay is an attempt at a comprehensive normative assessment on the North Korea’s nuclear weapons. It does not see North Korea’s nuclear weapons illegal in the current international law. Nevertheless, it does not approve of them in the wider sense of law. This essay begins with the question of legality of the nuclear weapons themselves. Here the advisory opinion of ICJ of 1996 provides a good reference. Secondly, this essay addresses the question whether or not North Korea is entitled to nuclear weapons even if the weapons are not illegal per se. Here the validity of the North Korea’s withdrawal from NPT matters. Even though North Korea’s withdrawal from NPT is valid, North Korea’s nuclear weapons would be blamed as threat to peace on the Chapter 7 of UN Charter. Last but not least, the nuclear deterrence is to be considered. There are various theses that legitimizes the deterrence policy in the realm of both international relations theory and the just war theory. North Korea’s deterrence policy could win approval of the realists like Kenneth Waltz, but would fail to satisfy the requirements of the just war theory.