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노동조합과 기업 간의 임금협상에 관한 두 가지 고전적인 모형으로 독점노조모형과 효율적 협상모형이 있는데, 이 두 모형은 Espinosa and Rhee(1989)에서 보는 바와 같이 반복게임모형을 이용하여 하나로 통합될 수 있다. 본 논문에서는 Espinosa and Rhee의 모형에 정부의 최저임금제 정책을 도입하여 그 경제적 효과를 살펴본다. 일반적으로 최저임금이 지나치게 높게 책정될 경우에는 내쉬 협상해가 배제됨으로써 비효율적인 균형이 나타날 수 있다. 그러나 소득재분배라는 관점에서 볼 때에는 단조성을 갖지 않는 내쉬 협상해의 특성 때문에 때로는 노동조합에게 유리한 균형이 나타날 수도 있음을 보인다.


Traditional analysis of firm and labor union interaction in labor economics have focused on two static models. One is the monopoly union model originated by Dunlop and the other is the efficient bargaining model analyzed by Nash. Espinosa and Rhee reconciled these two approaches within the framework of repeated games?. They analyzed an infinitely repeated sequential bargaining game between a firm and a labor union with the union moving first. A subgame perfect equilibrium in this game can generate an efficient outcome, as in Nash, if the firm is sufficiently far sighted, but it is different from the cooperative agreement, as in Dunlop, if the firm is short sighted.This paper shows how the equilibrium in Espinosa and Rhee's model changes when government enforces the minimum wage law. In contrast to Espinosa and Rhee, the equilibrium outcome can be an inefficient allocation even if the firm is far sighted. We also analyze how minimum wage affects the distribution of surplus between two players. As Kalai and Smorodinsky pointed out, the Nash bargaining solution could violate the monotonicity condition when the set of attainable payoffs in a bargaining situation changes. Due to this property of the Nash bargaining solution, the labor union can receive a larger share of surplus in the new equilibrium.