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The author attempts to deal with an inter‐Korean cooperation approach to the Korean peace‐building process. The inter‐Korean first‐ever summit meeting in June 2000 produced an inter‐Korean joint declaration of June 15, 2000. This landmark declaration provided a framework for institutionalizing a peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas. The objectives of this article are: (1) to examine the significance of the June 15 joint declaration which laid a foundation for a new inter‐Korean peace process after the summit; (2) to examine the inter‐Korean cooperation approach to the peace regime building; and (3) to analyze key issues between the two Koreas and the U.S. in the peace process. Three major arguments are presented in this article. First, the Korean peace‐building process is the first and necessary step for achieving Korean reunification. Second, the two Koreas and the U.S. should continue to remove key obstacles to inter‐Korean reconciliation, cooperation and peace process. Third, the two Koreas need to work together to find an alternative to the South's principle of an inter‐Korean peace agreement and the North's principle of a North Korea‐U.S. peace treaty to establish an agreed framework for a durable peace. Seoul and Pyongyang need to reactivate the South‐North Korean Joint Military Commission established by the 1992 inter‐Korean basic agreement and hold inter‐Korean government talks on military issues to discuss a new Korean peace system from an inter‐Korean perspective. The inter‐Korean peace‐building process depends largely on three factors: the political will of the two Korean leaders, South Korean domestic political process and economic conditions, and the international factors, especially President Bush's new policy toward North Korea and a global anti‐terrorism campaign led by the U.S. The author makes several policy recommendations for the Korean peace‐building process: (1) South and North Korea need to sincerely abide by inter‐Korean agreements to build mutual trust; (2) President Kim should actively and positively gather a national consensus on and bipartisan support for his North Korea policy, and (3) Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo must continue to maintain trilateral cooperation in dealing with North Korea. The author argues that the Bush administration needs to soften its hard‐line, hostile policy toward North Korea for promoting the inter‐Korean peace process.