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The purpose of this study is to analyze the interaction among inter-Korean negotiations, internal politics, and international environment by examining South Korea’s bargaining with North for rice assistance at Beijing in 1995. This study analyzed the negotiations by using the ‘two-level games logic’ while adding one more level-international environment which means the policy adjustment among South Korea, the US, and Japan. In the 1995 negotiations, the international environment, in which Pyonyang’s relationships with Washington and Tokyo were improving, weakened the bargaining power of Seoul which hurried the rice assistance to North Korea in order to resume inter-Korean dialogue. In internal politics, negative opinion to the rice assistance increased after the first negotiations owing to North Korean haughty attitude in the dialogue table. The negative public opinion narrowed the ‘win-set’ of South Korea, and the South Korean government could use ‘tying hands’ strategy which strengthened Seoul’s bargaining leverage vis-a-vie Pyongyang to some extent in the second negotiation. However, the success in the second negotiation was limited because the South Korean government could not make tactical movement. In the third meeting the South Korean government decided to stop rice supply, giving in to hard-line public opinion. Thus, the negotiations were finally ruptured.