초록

Purpose - This study examines whether price cartel firms perform downward earnings management to avoid or minimize penalty surcharges levied by the Korea Fair Trade Commission and analyzes such earnings management in distribution industry. Research design, data, and methodology - We use 247 firms from 64 price cartel cases in the period of 2011-2016, and collect data from 3 years before to 3 years after the start of price cartel. Earnings management is measured by discretionary accruals. Three discretionary accrual estimation models are employed; modified Jones model, ROA adjusted modified Jones model and CFO-adjusted modified Jones model. For pre- and post-cartel periods, one year, two year, and three year windows are used. Additional empirical analyses are performed for distribution industry sub-sample of 25 cartel firms. Result - The regression results show that cartel firms' discretionary accruals are significantly lower in the period after the start of price cartel than before. And discretionary accruals are lower in cartel firms than in non-cartel firms during the cartel period. Cartel firms in distribution industry also show the earnings management similar to those in other industries. Conclusions - These two findings lead to the conjecture that managers of cartel firms manage their earnings downward. This behavior is indistinguishable between firms in distribution industry and other industries.

키워드

Price Cartel, Distribution Industry, Earnings Management, Discretionary Accruals.

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